some of the partners of nato took greater responsibility than some of the actual members. now, that's an interesting new development. i guess the participation of sweden, which was seamless, which was important, is a very, very important point in case. and i would also like to say that there are other partners suddenly that we see who are actually able to contribute more than some of the actual members, like finland. so what i would like to hope is that at the summit there will it be some discussion about the future of the partnership, which is a new element, if you want a pillar of what the alliance can stand for and can look like in the future. there is one question here, you know. the question, will it help close the gap, should nato move

towards a human approach, contributing to the protection of every individual, human being, and not just focus merely on the defensive territorial borders. i think, honestly, it's the wrong question to ask. i don't think nato will take upon itself responsibilities that are basically the responsibilities of the civilian forces. this brings me to my final point. don't underestimate the reserves and the possibilities and the opportunities. we have in enhancing eu nato cooperation. eu -- more and more civilian crisis management issues will be the task of the transatlantic community. and the european union has these capabilities. i just hope we get some of the internal obstacles that we have in nato and the internal

obstacles we have within the eu politicly to get this out of the way, so that the eu/nato cooperation can move ahead. in conclusion, i'd like to just say that i do believe that a ren renewed nato, a reinventeded nato, can still be the institution of choice of the transatlantic relationship for the 21st century. >> i just thank you very much for that. i see i'm going to regret using the snow white metaphor. >> it's always great. >> john. >> thanks. well, first, let me lay my cards out on the table and say i don't see this as gloomy news whatsoever. i've been pushing for cuts in military spending here in the united states and throughout europe for a decade or more. so i see it all as great news. i just want to be clear about

that. because i see the problem here. and folks coming from europe, from asia, come to the united states, and they realize it immediately when they go into a restaurant. and they see the size of the entree that is are served here. and they realize we have a problem with portion control here the united states. and it's no surprise that we have a problem with obesity. and it's not just the quantity of food that we eat. it's the quality of food that we eat. we eat a lot of junk food. and you're thinking right now maybe i've come to the wrong conference by accident. but no, there is i think a strong connection between our attitudes towards food and our attitudes toward the pentagon. the pentagon has gone an enormous eating spree over the last decade and has grown enormous. and this conversation about what is it for has not taken place. yes, we haven't had a conversation among nato allies about why we should be cutting this or cutting that. but we also haven't had a

conversation about why we ever spent this money in the first place. that i think is the question that we should be -- the conversation we should be having. right now, here in the united states, we have basically throw approaches to the obesity problem facing nato and u.s. spending. and the three options are basically this. and they were alluded to in the last panel, and i'll just go over them very briefly. essentially, the republicans have laid out various options for eating more. in other words, the house has offered a proposal to add $4 billion on top of what the pentagon has asked for. they have put forward an alternative to sequestration. i won't go into that.

mitt romney says we should spend $2.1 trillion more over what the obama administration has laid out. $2.1 trillion more. not cutting, more. the obama administration. more or less stayed the course. all the talk of the obama administration making significant cuts in the military, not really. if we look over the next ten years, 500, $600 million, but over ten years, given inflation,it not that much in terms of cuts. the third option, of course, is the gastric bypass, the fact that pentagon can't be expected to deal with this problem by itself and there must be much more radical, surgical solutions to this problem.

it's not just a partisan thing. tom coburn, republican, rather conservative republican, came out with a proposal over the summer to cut $1 trillion in military spending. which i thought was quite remarkable. we came out with a detailed list with not only cuts we think can be made without endangering the security, have to repeat that, without endangering the security of the united states. but also where the money could be usefully floapplied to promo nonmilitary conflicts. beefing up, in other words, various existing structures, beefing up other parts of the u.s. government. just a week ago, maybe, project

for international policy attitudes and two other polling firms showed where u.s. public's attitudes are about cutting military spending, and they found that, in fact, the u.s. public -- republicans and democrats alike are far more radical in terms of what they support in terms of military cuts. an average of 18%. immediate annual cut in military spending. so what are the implication of this on nato, the debate here in the united states. the possibility of perhaps more significant cuts in u.s. military spending. although, again, as i want to emphasize, we're not seeing that immediately with what the obama administration is proposing. but if sequestration goes through and we're forced to do it, then we might see some significant cuts. what would be the implications? well, first of all, hurray, the cold war is over. finally nato would have to face the fact that it doesn't need these weapon systems which were

designed to fight a cold war. tactical nuclear weapons? do we really need those? the danish submarines i think you referred to? do we really need those? those brigades we're planning on removing from europe, do we really need those? do we need all those u.s. military bases in europe, which were designed for the cold war? nato would be forced to face a reality that the cold war ended 20 years ago. second, that we would see -- i would hope, and there was some discussion of this already at this conference, an emphasis on nonmilitary solutions. i was saddened, way long time ago, 20 years ago, when the csce when it was the csce, was radically de-emphasized in favor of nato in the wake of the collapse of the soviet union and communism.

that was -- i'm -- i'm regretful today as i was then a -- an option, i'm sorry, that we didn't pursue, beefing up the -- what bill the osce. and the previous panel, one of the presenters talked about why the eu in comparison to nato wasn't particularly effective. well, look at the budgets. i mean, geez, you know, if the eu or osce had as much money available as nato, perhaps they could be a little bit more effective with some of the things they were talking about. anti piracy, et cetera. squeezing out waste and redundancy, i would love to see someone like mitt romney in his capacity at bane capital take an axe to the waste and redundancy in nato. we see it in the private sector. we see it in, you know, when people like mitt romney go to corporations. why don't we see it at nato? i think this kind of financial environment is perfect for such a -- an axe-wielder of that

nature to go in terms of waste and redundancy. it could potentially reduce russian anxieties, if we are spending less in terms of naeto overall. that might be a good way of sitting down at the table with russians and saying, hey, you don't have to worry about us so much. yes, we're pursuing missile defense, et cetera. but obviously, we're taking a very serious position on reducing spending within nato. finally, there are two aspects that mitigate against this happy news, from my point of view happy news, not necessarily everybody here. one is that we have a tendency to export our problems. we export our obesity problem by selling corn syrup all over the world, while, no surprise, we sell our arms as well.

and over the last two years, the obama administration has begun to reevaluate our export control regulations to facilitate greater arms exports. why? i mean, the reason is obvious. if our military contractors have fewer opportunities to get pentagon contracts, well, we will, ie, the obama administration, will do whatever it can to facilitate the sale of arms overseas to satisfy the bottom line of those military contractors. number two, of course, is in what we've talked about, burden sharing, i was surprised to see that canada was on the list of nato allies that were chastiseded for not pulling their weight. he said canada was part of the majority that was exerting an unfair burden on those who spend the resources. canada's the sixth largest spender within nato.

and its military budget went from $15 billion to $23 billion between 2005 and 2011. so here we have a country that actually is increasing, or up until recently, increasing its military spending, and it too has come under attack. so the pressure by the united states on our nato allies to increase their military spending, i think, is a countervailing pressure here, unfortunately. now, again, i'd like to have -- i'd like to promote this idea of having a conversation, not just about sharing capabilities. but fundamentally about why we are maintaining these capabilities, upgrading these capabilities, or even creating new capabilities. i think we have to have that conversation within nato. ultimate ultimately, and i'll end here, ultimately, it is easier to diet together. and i think that the united states and its nato allies, and i won't refer to snow white here, but ultimately, we have to work together to coordinate

these reductions rather than spending so much energy to try to figure out why we have to keep spending at the unsustainable rate that we've been spending over the last decade. few european countries buck the trend of low military spending in europe has been on a consistent basis been greece which is the focus for the last 20 years, around 4% of gdp on defense, where is the eu averages around 1.7. so it would be interesting to hear what maris has to say of the implications. >> i would actually correct you. it would be 5%. we're coming back to 2.2%.

nonetheless, we did pay our debt to nato for this year. now, here's the good news. the good news is that i'm the last speaker. the bad news is that i know that i've got to be short, not take too much of your time. allow me first of all to thank ian davis, paul ingram, ann and chris for their valuable contribution. this is an excellent conference. i thank you for getting us on board. now, another good news is that in order to watch the snow white with the seven dwarfs, you need a writer. somebody has to write about the story. so the story is, a smart defense is a news story coming up. the problem is, a smart defense not only reflects the united states cutting off the budget, but actually reflects more, i

would say also. the european union perception that when we need to cut back basically on everything. and my country and myself, we have this small problem that is called financial crisis now. so we need to cut basically on everything. imagine the defense -- the minister of defense in greece cut back $1 million in one day, just like that. now, the problem is, that nato is still -- nato should and still is valid, and it will be valid for the future to come. for us in southeastern europe, nato is the only credible security organization in the euro atlantic region. and nato's fundamental question, and in this case, i speak for myself, that nato has decided what it wants to do with its future. and it will go along. so i wouldn't believe i would actually say that in the u.s., but would i have to dismiss any

of those, you know, opinions that say that basically what is natu nato capable for, what do we need nato so on and so forth. the cold war is over. yeah. okay, nato knows the cold war is over, and proceeded to the next step. and that next step is cold emerging challenges, securing threats and is so forth. the 2001 terrorist acts in the u.s. were nothing about cold war. they were all about new modern age symmetrical warfare. and i think nato is concentrating more on that. the problem is that in order to have a collective organization of 28 member states, working together is the issue of capabilities, interpretability, not only of forces, but also of civilian international stuff that works inside nato. at the same time, this reflects also the governments and the way they negotiate and the way they portray their policy orientations. nato itself is a super national

entity that actually requires for governments to be open-minded and know their burden sharing and offer their ca capabilities as also their human capital and their finances. greece has been able to do everything except human capital, we've been giving a lot of money at nato, we've been offering a lot. we're leading the nrf for 2012. nobody mentioned the nrf. but this is basically the -- nato's battalion, if i may use your word of battalion, but this is nato's battalion that should be engaged at some point in some operation, but it's nonetheless, not engaged yet. and so the question is, for the upcoming nato chicago summit, what do we do with interpretability, what do we do with capacity building capabilities and so on and so forth. so we call that smart defense. the secretary general of nato called that smart defense. i would like to use that sharing of idea. i totally agree with smart defense. it should be negotiated. i also believe that my country

should also take the step up. we need to solve our issues, whether this is a regional issue or not regional issues. for us, a fiscal crisis is also a political crisis that we resolve issues and move forward. we take the step, and we move along and move ahead. so i will not take too much -- too long of your time. but i will -- i will divide my speech into three parts. the first part is that i will explain how i understand or how we understand in southeastern europe smart defense. what is smart defense in southeastern europe, engaging in it their expertise. and what is to expect to the chicago summit from our leaders. now, if -- i can give a title to my whole speech, i would give it -- creating a smart defense and engaging a smart alliance. now, in an international connected environment that is full of challenges and threats, in times of austerity, and historical political changes, smart defense, an essence of and for alliance unity has come

forth. it is expected to be officially negotiated and presented to this upcoming summit this week at the nato chicago summit. smart defense is a new security culture comprehension. and this is the same thing that i personally do either as an academic or heading my own institute. it is a new way of thinking. it is all about generating modern defense capabilities. it's all about new ideas. it's about the future of nato as an alliance, not only in conceptual framework, but actually tactical and strategic. it is all about the encouragement of corporate defense, and it's all about maintaining military capabilities, but also enhancing military capabilities with low -- as low as possible financial costs and human capital. according to the concept, nato is moving forward on the 21st century. 21st century challenges requirage i'll forces. compatible forces but also

deployable forces. may i remind you that greece has forces, but we're not deployable forces. we're static forces. nato needs interable forces. we also need to have smart budgets, directed funds for capacity-building and planning effectiveness. we also need to be operationally viable with minimum budgets possible and enhanced technology, minimum human costs and time -- specific time frame in operations in and out. smart defense is all about renewing operation and tactical effectiveness and alliance coordination. it's all about specialization. smart defense is about to set priorities and to better coordinate collective efforts. therefore, smart defense is all about geographical proximity but also capability. area distribution. it is a correlation of military coordinating joint and not duplicating procedures such as the balance stick missile

defense, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maintenance, training, enforced preparation, as well as effective engagement. all this with a minimum cost, casualties and high level of technology preparedness. no wonder we have this issue as well. cyber defense should be and it is the solution. it aligns national capability priorities with those of nato, as it super nationalizes policies with cooperative and consensus level agreement that produce a cost-effective projection. planning and application in both theater but also real-world operations. specialization, therefore, is a key word. it is the essence of coordinated efforts, low-cost fiscal human cooperation, effectiveness and guaranteed engagement the for the future. specialization is a form of cooperation of geographical interests or of strategic sharing of costs collectively or

individually, but positively decisively directed. smart defense is therefore a long-term viable solution. defense ministers have paved the way. foreign ministers agreed, the fourth coming chicago elements are expected to be addressed. overall defense package is to be negotiated. a constant, smart defense is expected to rise up you to the level. it will be a new approach a new commitment, a new mind-set of capabilities, political and military. a new security culture understanding, and application that is now expected to be decided. what is assured, engagement of smart defense will equally mean we approachment the of collective understanding in the new year -- and also fidelity. let me go to smart defense in southeastern europe. is it engaging their expertise? simple. it is not. it is not well-comprehended due

to the inability or unwillingness for politic and thus military engagement. the good news, they are interested in learning more. unfortunately, in time of austerity measures and political challenges but also changes, issues such as smart defense say or become a secondary issue of concern. nonetheless, national and collective defense remains at the forefront of interests of states with issues that are of security and defense concerns. as long as there are regional and peripheral concerns, smart defense and security issues will be raised, eventually i wanted and even complimented through initiatives of support. to what concerns smart defense in greece, i would say that we are -- we have already made engagement the ment. we have well prepared, we have high quality level of dlirables, unlike the situation that exists this week in greece. what do we need to do now?

as greeks, we need to reaffirm commitments, realign relations and alliances. develop and resolve issues of concern whether regional or peripheral. we need to request more human capital in applied positions that will level the concern burden but also support new community culture both internally and to the alliance and to the members separately. and if you give me a minute, i would say to what is expected to the chicago summit, but also to the post chicago summit meeting is that we will -- we should need to create a smart defense conceptualization, specialization affording a new security framework and actual at your, deliverables, looking forward to a new engagement with minimum cost and minimum human capital. thank you very much. >> yes, thank you very much. right. i'm going to open it up for discussion. we have 35 minutes. i would ask that you try and keep your comments and questions

brief. and i'll try to ensure the package do likewise in reply. can we take them in batches of three, please, and can you identify yourself and your affiliation. the man in the front here, and then -- a couple more. >> specifically about the missile defense across europe there. last time i was -- ron fischer, we the people now.org. last summer, i kind of wiped out over 100 bases or cities with warheads. the apm, as it gets -- i would like to know, do we really want to build that stupid system? it's against the international treaty, it's also absolutely ineffective. do we want to build abl?

>> thanks. transatlantic relations. my question is about something that some of the panelists have touched upon. but i would like to specifically ask you with regard to your expectations for the chicago summit whether the discussion about specialization and coordination will be accompanied by a debate over a vision of what nato actually wants to do with a smart defense force. in terms of -- in the sense of going beyond just counting budget numbers and weapons programs, but really discussing what -- whether there is actually a vision of what this force should be for, and i would say in order -- coming back to the buffet metaphor that ms. smith has used, of course you want to make sure that not everyone brings salads and forgets the brownies, but you also need to know what kind of party you want to throw. and does nato know what kind of party it wants to throw in ten

years' time. >> thank you. and i think there was someone just behind. thank you. >> thank you. john from the nato defense college. my question was actually also about the analogy. and that maybe the other panelists can also answer my question. the analogy is relevant and i'm convinced in the case of the u.s. in the case of european allies, i'm more skeptical. and i was wondering, what's the threshold you identify under which thety decrease of defense expenditures can no longer maintain the credibility of nato as an alliance to fulfill its commitment, more specifically the article 5. you mentioned the brigades and u.s. nuclear weapons. if we remove them, all of the u.s. military footprint in europe, how do you convince, for instance, the partners -- not the partners, the allies in the

baltics, which are actually a very frightened by the russian -- how do you convince them that article 5 is still credible? so that's my question. >> thank you. so i think we've got a question on the rationale for building missile defenses, particularly in the context is this part of a smart solution. the detail of specialization and cooperation, how does that fit into a broader vision when nato wants to go. and then on the context of dieting, when is enough, enough? is maybe i'll ask all of the panelists to consider those questions. you can dip in and answer either or ally of three of them. they can choose. you can start, julie. >> okay. well, i'll try maybe the second one and then i'll say a word about missile defense. as was noted earlier on the

panel, i think nato, ever since -- it's obvious, we've said this at numerous conferences, countless conferences over the years, but ever since the end of the cold war, yes, the alliance has struggled to have that single vision of what the future holds. and obviously, if you take a short tour through portugal and poland and norway and estonia and canada, you get different answers. there are lots of different threats that are listed by allies when they think about what the future is for this alliance. and it ranges from everything from the more traditional article 5 to energy security, cyber, arctic issues, high north. the list goes on and on. and so what was useful in at least bringing that together in some sort of comprehensive vision was what we went through at the last summit, to d